Exposition of Quine's various theses asserting the underdetermination of translation by our grasp of the particular language(s). Modern developments on these subjects.

Normally, the content of a proposition is identified with its truth condition and the content of other conceptual entities, such as objects, are identified with those properties of the object that can make a contribution to the truth of predicates applied to it. Narrow content is that part of content that is wholly cognitive, rather than purely objective. Is there any such thing as narrow content? This is perhaps the hottest debate in the theory of meaning, and is at the heart of the current debate about intentionality.

This category is devoted to what Quine would call theories of reference (see his `On what there is'), ie. theories that do not contain an explicit theory of sense. In particular of interest are Kripke's New Theory of Reference, possible worlds semantics, knowledge and belief representation, Millian semantics, Carnap-Davidson-Tarski -style semantics and so on.